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DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF PRIVACY: PIGGIE
PORN IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Interpreting Texas law, the Fifth Circuit recently held that a woman
who worked with a pig as part of a novelty act at an amusement park was
not a public figure, that the woman could not recover damages for both
defamation and invasion of privacy when a picture of the woman with
the pig was published in a hard core men's magazine, and that it was
proper for the trial court to admit into evidence the entire issue of the
magazine in which the picture appeared.
Jeannie Braun, the plaintiff in Braun v. Flynt,' was employed by
Aquarena Springs, an amusement park in Texas. Mrs. Braun's work ac-
tivities included participating in a show with Ralph, the Diving Pig. In
the show, Mrs. Braun would tread water in a pool while holding a bottle
of milk with a nipple on it. Ralph would dive into the pool, swim to Mrs.
Braun, and feed from the bottle. The amusement park made pictures and
postcards of the act, showing Ralph diving toward Mrs. Braun.
Chic magazine was a Larry Flynt publication. Its dominant theme
was female nudity. The magazine was alleged to depict "unchastity in
women," and contained caricatures that were "indecent." The Fifth Cir-
cuit described Chic as a "glossy, oversized, hard-core men's magazine. "2
"Chic Thrills" was a regular feature in Chic which contained brief stories
about current events. Most of the stories concerned sex overtly, or were
accompanied by a photograph or cartoon of a sexual nature.3
In May 1977, one of Chic's editors saw the "Ralph, the Diving Pig"
act at Aquarena Springs. He saw some postcards of Ralph, the Diving
1. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 252 (1984).
2. Id. at 247.
3. The court described the "Chic Thrills" feature of the December 1977 issue of Chic
magazine as follows:
On the same page on which Mrs. Braun's picture appeared were stories about
"10 Things that P--- Off Women" with accompanying cartoon of a woman whose
large breasts are partially exposed; a story entitled "Mammaries Are Made of This"
about men whose breasts have been enlarged by exposure to a synthetic hormone,
with an accompanying cartoon showing a man with large breasts; and a story entitled
"Chinese Organ Grinder" about the use of sexual organs from deer, dogs and seals as
a Chinese elixir. On the facing page is a picture showing a nude female model dem-
onstrating navel jewelry and an article on "Lust Rock Rules" about a "throbbing
paean" to sex written by "the Roman Polanski of rock." The cover of the issue shows
a young woman sitting in a chair with her shirt open so as partially to reveal her
breasts, one hand to her mouth and the other hand in her tightly-fitting, unzipped
pants.
Braun, 726 F.2d at 248.
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Pig, and thought that a picture of Ralph should appear in "Chic Thrills."
The editor contacted the amusement park's public relations director and
requested photographs of Ralph. When the public relations director in-
quired about the nature of the magazine, the editor replied that Chic was
a men's magazine featuring fashion, travel and humor. The editor added
that Chic had the same readership as Redbook and McCall's. Aquarena
Springs then supplied Chic with photographs of Ralph and Mrs. Braun.
A picture of Ralph and Mrs. Braun appeared with a caption4 in the
"Chic Thrills" section of the December 1977 issue of Chic. Mrs. Braun
learned of her inclusion in the magazine shortly after the issue was.pub-
lished and she quickly filed suit, alleging defamation and false light inva-
sion of privacy.
At trial the jury awarded Mrs. Braun $5,000 in actual damages and
$25,000 in punitive damages for defamation, plus $15,000 in actual dam-
ages and $50,000 in punitive damages for invasion of privacy, for a total
award of $95,000.' Chic appealed the decision.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mrs. Braun was not a pub-
lic figure,6 and that the trial court did not err in admitting the entire
December 1977 issue of Chic into evidence to show the context in which
Mrs. Braun's picture appeared.7 However, the court held that the jury
gave Mrs. Braun a double recovery by awarding damages for both defa-
mation and invasion of privacy.8 The court resolved the double recovery
problem by allowing Mrs. Braun to retry the issue of damages or to ac-
cept the damage award for invasion of privacy only.9
Mrs. Braun as a Private Figure
The seminal case in modern defamation law for media defendants is
New York Times v. Sullivan,' ° where the United States Supreme Court
held that a public official may not recover for defamatory statements re-
lating to official conduct unless the public official proves that the state-
ment was made with "actual malice"; that is, with the knowledge that it
4. SWINE DIVE-A pig that swims? Why not? This plucky porker performs every
day at Aquarena Springs Amusement Park in bustling San Marcos, Texas.
Aquarena staff members say the pig was incredibly easy to train. They told him to
learn quick, or grow up to be a juicy ham sandwich.
Braun, 726 F.2d at 248, n.2.
5. Id. at 248.
6. Id. at 250.
7. Id. at 254.
8. Id. at 251.
9. Id. at 251-52.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.II
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,'2 the Supreme Court applied the
New York Times actual malice standard to public figures as well as public
officials. 3 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that
the distinctions between the public and private sectors have become
blurred, due to the merging of the two to solve problems previously
solved solely in the public sector.' 4 As a result there is a heavier concen-
tration of power in the private sector, and many who do not hold public
office are nonetheless intimately involved in the resolution of "important
public questions."' 5 The public's interest in the conduct of these "public
figures" is as legitimate as the interest in the conduct of public officials,
and "uninhibited debate" concerning the involvement of public figures in
public issues is just as crucial.' 6 Furthermore, these "public figures"
have as much access to media as public officials, and are able to use the
media to influence policy and respond to criticism.' 7
The Supreme Court elaborated further on the public figure concept
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. "8 One whose achievements have brought
notoriety or who has vigorously and successfully sought public attention
is a public figure. ' One who has thrust himself to the forefront of a
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of a public issue,
and who by doing so invites attention and comment, is a public figure.2"
Applying the standards set forth in New York Times, Curtis, and
Gertz, the Braun court held that Mrs. Braun was not a public figure.2 '
Thus, Mrs. Braun was not required to prove that Chic acted with "actual
malice," that is, with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth
or falsity. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Mrs. Braun's limited public
exposure as a passive assistant in a novelty act did not make her a public
11. The New York Times court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice--that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
12. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
13. Id. at 164.
14. Id. at 163-64.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 164.
17. Id.
18. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
19. Id. at 342.
20. Id. at 345.
21. Braun, 726 F.2d at 250.
1986]
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figure. 2 The court found no public controversy or issue in which Mrs.
Braun had become involved. 3 The court stated that Mrs. Braun, in her
limited role as an entertainer, "cannot be said to have relinquished inter-
est in protecting her name and reputation ... 24
Double Recovery for Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy
Under Texas law, a communication is defamatory if it tends to in-
jure one's reputation and "thereby expose[s] him to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach [his] honesty,
integrity, or virtue, or reputation. ' 25 In addition, the Gertz test requires
that a private person-one who is not a public official or a public figure-
must prove at least that the person making the defamatory statement
knew or should have known that the statement was false.26 In order to
recover compensatory damages, Gertz requires that a private person must
demonstrate actual injury, or meet the New York Times standard of ac-
tual malice for damages to be presumed.27 A private person must also
meet the New York Times actual malice standard to recover punitive
damages.2 ' A recent United States Supreme Court decision has limited
the Gertz restrictions on presumed and punitive damages in defamation
cases involving private persons to cases in which a private person sues for
defamation involving a matter of public concern. 29 Thus, the states need
only require that a private person who sues for defamation involving a
matter of private concern prove that the defendant negligently published
the false statement.
Under Texas law, a person who, by giving publicity concerning an-
other, places the other in a false light, is liable for invasion of privacy if
"(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offen-
22. Id.
23. Id. A recent United States Supreme Court decision has made this consideration an
especially relevant one. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939, 2948 (1985), the Court held that states may permit recovery for presumed and punitive
damages absent a showing of actual malice when the defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern.
24. Braun, 726 F.2d at 250. However, even a public figure does not completely relinquish
the interest in his or her good name and reputation; rather, under New York Times and its
progeny such an interest is protected if the defamatory statement was made without "actual
malice," that is, without knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.
25. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (Vernon 1958).
26. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49. Texas has applied this minimum negligence standard to
defamation cases involving private individuals. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541
S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49.
28. Id.
29. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941, 2948.
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sive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted
in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed."3
Although defamation and false light invasion of privacy are two dif-
ferent torts with substantially different elements, the instructions the trial
court in Braun gave the jury were identical in many aspects.3 ' The Fifth
Circuit found that the elements of the two causes of action were not suffi-
ciently distinguished from each other to assure that there was no double
compensation.32 Such double compensation runs counter to "[tihe pol-
icy which motivates the holding of Gertz [which] requires that there be
only a single recovery where the same items of damages are alleged under
both defamation and invasion of privacy theories."33
30. Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (quoting Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 652E (1977)). Comment b to § 652E states in relevant part:
Relation to defamation. The interest protected by this Section is the interest of
the individual in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false
light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he is. In many cases to
which the rule stated here applies, the publicity given to the plaintiff is defamatory,
so that he would have an action for libel or slander. . . . In such a case the action
for invasion of privacy will afford an alternative or additional remedy, and the plain-
tiff can proceed upon either theory, or both, although he can have but one recovery
for a single instance of publicity.
It is not, however, necessary to the action for invasion of privacy that the plain-
tiff be defamed. It is enough that he is given unreasonable and highly objectionable
publicity that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and
so is placed before the public in a false position. When this is the case and the matter
attributed to the plaintiff is not defamatory, the rule here stated affords a different
remedy, not available in an action for defamation.
False light invasion of privacy is but one of four different causes of action for invasion of
privacy recognized by the Second Restatement. The other three are:
"(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another...
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . ..
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life .
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977).
31. The jury was given the following instructions regarding damages:
In order to recover damages to compensate for the defamation, Mrs. Braun
must show that she has suffered or will suffer an impairment of her reputation or
standing in her community, personal humiliation or mental anguish and suffering as
a direct result of the publication of her picture in Chic ...
If you find that Mrs. Braun's privacy was wrongfully invaded, then you may
consider an award of compensatory damages. Do not consider the elements of the
cause of action for defamation in awarding damages for invasion of privacy. In
awarding compensatory damages, you may consider Mrs. Braun's personal humilia-
tion, mental anguish and suffering.
Braun, 726 F.2d at 251 n.7.
32. Id. at 251.
33. Id. at 250. Apparently, the "policy" underlying Gertz was set forth in the following
statements in the Gertz opinion:
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake in defamation suits by
private individuals allows the States to impose liability on the publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that required by
1986]
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The court found that the evidence Mrs. Braun submitted dealt al-
most exclusively with her personal pain and suffering over the publica-
tion of her picture in Chic, and concluded that the jury had compensated
Mrs. Braun primarily for false light invasion of privacy.34 The court
then proposed two solutions to the double recovery problem: to remand
the case for trial on the issue of damages, or to allow Mrs. Braun to
accept the award for false light invasion of privacy only.35
The Context in Which the Picture Appeared
At trial, Chic moved to exclude from admission into evidence the
contents of the December 1977 issue of Chic magazine which were unre-
lated to Mrs. Braun's picture. The trial court denied the motion and
admitted the entire magazine into evidence.3 6 The Fifth Circuit found
the issue to be whether Mrs. Braun's picture should have been admitted
by itself or whether the entire magazine should have been admitted.
3 7
The court held that the trial court properly admitted the entire issue into
evidence.3" The court relied heavily on its ruling in Golden Bear Distrib-
uting Systems of Texas v. Chase Revel, Inc. "
New York Times. . . .But this countervailing state interest [in compensating private
individuals for injury to reputation] extends no further than compensation for actual
injury ....
[T]he States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs .. gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury ....
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory false-
hood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49.
The Braun court's refusal to uphold an award of damages for both causes of action is in
line with the position taken by the Second Restatement. See infra note 30 at § 652E, comment
b.
34. Braun, 726 F.2d at 251.
35. Id. at 251-52. The court did not allow Mrs. Braun the choice of accepting the award
for defamation because the court found that the jury had primarily compensated Mrs. Braun
for humiliation and embarrassment, injuries which give rise to an action for false light invasion
of privacy.
36. Id. at 253.
37. Id. at 254.
38. Id.
39. 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983). In Golden Bear, the defendant was a magazine which
published a monthly "Fraud" feature which exposed instances of consumer and investor fraud.
A particular feature concerned the activities of several companies which operated in different
states under the name of Golden Bear Distributing Systems. Each company was operated as a
franchise of the parent company, Golden Bear of California. However, other than common
advertising and sales techniques, the different companies had no connection with one another.
The allegedly defamatory "Fraud" feature discussed an investment fraud lawsuit which had
been brought against Golden Bear of California and legal difficulties experienced by Golden
Bear of Utah. The feature stated that Golden Bear's sales techniques were used by all Golden
Bear companies. The article gave as an example a sales presentation used by a Golden Bear of
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In Golden Bear, as in Braun, the defendant sought to allow admis-
sion of only the part of a magazine article which mentioned the plaintiff.
In holding that the entire article should be admitted into evidence, the
Fifth Circuit stated that the allegedly defamatory statements should be
considered in the context of the whole article, so that the jury could de-
termine how the ordinary reader of the publication would perceive the
statements. 4° Even though the statements which mentioned the plaintiff
may be true if considered outside of the context of the article, the state-
ments are defamatory if the overall effect of the publication is
defamatory.4
Citing Golden Bear for the proposition that the truth of a statement
depends on the overall impression created by the context in which it was
published, the Braun court held that a jury could find that the ordinary
reader of Chic would form an unfavorable opinion of the character of a
woman whose photograph appeared in Chic.42 The Braun court held
that it was proper to admit the entire December 1977 issue of Chic, "a
magazine devoted exclusively to sexual exploitation and to disparage-
ment of women," so that the jury could assume the place of an ordinary
reader of Chic magazine.43
The United States Supreme Court first considered allegedly defama-
tory material in the context in which the material was published in
Washington Post v. Chaloner.4 The Chaloner court held that "'[a] pub-
lication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the
sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily un-
derstand it. So the whole item . . . should be read and construed to-
gether, and its meaning and signification thus determined.' 45
The Chaloner reasoning has been embodied in section 563 of the
Second Restatement of Torts: "The meaning of a communication is that
which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands
that it was intended to express."
46
Texas marketing director. The feature did not expressly state that Golden Bear of Texas had
perpetrated fraud or was under investigation for fraud.
40. Id. at 948.
41. Id. at 949.
42. Braun, 726 F.2d at 254.
43. Id.
44. 250 U.S. 290 (1919).
45. Id. at 293, quoting Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 149 F. 704, 706-07 (6th Cir.
1907).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 563 (1977). Comment d to § 563 states:
In determining the meaning of a communication, words, whether written or
spoken, are to be construed together with their context. Words which standing alone
may reasonably be understood as defamatory may be so explained or qualified by
1986]
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The Chaloner/Restatement view has been adopted in many states,
including California.47 However, the cases adopting this view have dealt
with statements contained in articles published in magazines and news-
papers, statements contained in chapters of books, or statements made
during segments of television broadcasts. The courts in these cases have
their context as to make such an interpretation unreasonable. So too, words which
alone are innocent may in their context clearly be capable of a defamatory meaning
and may be so understood. The context of a defamatory imputation includes all
parts of the communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.
47. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the entire newspaper article in
which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared was admitted to show the context of the
statements); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983) (under Kansas law, eighteen
separate statements about a psychiatrist in a book critical of the quality of mental health care
could be examined individually for their truth or falsity as long as they were read in context);
Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S.
861 (1978) (under Pennsylvania law, inclusion of a former public official in a television broad-
cast about corruption on the part of public officials was incapable of defamatory meaning even
if considered in the context of the broadcast where no material mistatement of fact occurred);
Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981) (under New Jersey law, a
photograph in a sociology textbook showing a police officer prodding a black man with a night
stick followed by a caption questioning whether the suspect would be treated the same if he
were white is to be considered in the educational context in which it appeared); Desert Sun
Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1979) (letter to
newspaper editor which lambasted a political candidate was considered in the context of a
statement of opinion in the spirit of political debate); Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 64
Ga. App. 139, 12 S.E.2d 414 (1940) (letters accusing plaintiff of financial improprieties were
published to others, and this constituted a cause of action for defamation because the letters
suggested that plaintiff had committed a crime and thus exposed him to hatred and ridicule);
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 975 (1982) (statements in a newspaper article which accused a criminal defense attorney
of using legal fees paid by his client to fix a case or bribe a judge should be considered in the
context of the whole article); Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376
(1980) (plaintiff sports announcer, whose name appeared in a magazine article stating that the
plaintiff was the only newscaster in town enrolled in a course for remedial speaking, did not
state a cause of action for defamation where the allegedly defamatory statements appeared in
the context of a humorous article); Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927) (a
newspaper article in which plaintiff minister was referred to as an "immigrant ignoramus,"
"unmannerly," "discourteous," and "ignorant," when considered in the context in which it
was written, defamed plaintiff); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847,
(1933) (statements in a newspaper article falsely accusing a sheriff of selling confiscated liquor
stills, when construed in the sense in which they would ordinarily be understood by those
reading the article, were defamatory); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W.
Va. 1984) (where there was unauthorized use of a photograph of a female coal miner, in a
newspaper article discussing sexual harassment of female miners, and where the miner had
suffered no sexual harassment, there existed a triable issue of-fact whether the plaintiff had
suffered sexual harassment); Samuelson v. Tribune Publishing Co., 42 Wyo. 419, 296 P. 220
(1931) (plaintiff, who was acquitted of first degree murder, who alleged that defendant pub-
lished a newspaper article which conveyed to its readers that plaintiff had been liberated with-
out punishment for an admitted homicide and that plaintiff had committed perjury in
connection with his acquittal, stated a cause of action for defamation even though the article
did not state that plaintiff had committed murder).
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focused on the particular article, chapter, or broadcast segment, but have
not gone so far as to view the entire newspaper, magazine, book, or
broadcast.
In admitting the entire December 1977 issue of Chic magazine, the
Braun court has gone beyond the area charted by Chaloner and devel-
oped by the jurisdictions that have confronted the context issue. The fact
that "Chic Thrills" and Chic magazine both contained sexually oriented
material is not, by itself, sufficient to warrant the admission of the entire
issue into evidence. "Chic Thrills," because of its factual orientation and
strictly humorous tone, stands apart from the rest of Chic magazine,
which, according to the Braun court, "is a glossy, oversized, hard-core
men's magazine" which "depicts unchastity in women."4
Admission of the entire issue of Chic into evidence could have actu-
ally distorted the jury's perception of the effect "Chic Thrills" had on the
ordinary reader. Furthermore, the entire issue's probative value may
have been outweighed by its prejudicial impact on the jury. It is entirely
possible that Mrs. Braun prevailed, not because Chic invaded her pri-
vacy, but because the jury found Chic magazine to be in poor taste.49
The Braun court could have admitted only the "Chic Thrills" sec-
tion of the magazine and excluded the remainder. However, the court
never discussed this possibility. By framing the issue in terms of admit-
ting the picture of Mrs. Braun "in isolation" or admitting the entire mag-
azine, the court foreclosed itself from considering Mrs. Braun's picture in
the context in which it actually appeared-that is, in the "Chic Thrills"
section.
The broad scope of the Braun decision may operate as an infringe-
ment upon the first amendment rights of the media. If a magazine pub-
lishes an article which contains statements about a person who happens
to find the magazine distasteful, under Braun that person may sue the
magazine and have the entire issue in which the article appeared admit-
ted into evidence at trial. The entire issue will be admitted even if noth-
ing in the article was untrue or portrayed the person in a false light, even
if the tone and style of the article was strikingly different from that of the
magazine, and even if it is clear that the ordinary reader of the magazine
would view the statements in the context of the article but not in the
48. Braun, 726 F.2d at 247.
49. The Braun court admitted that "the evidentiary impact of the portions of the magazine
was significant," but stated that admission of the entire magazine was not "unfairly prejudi-
cial" (original emphasis) because "[the] trial court instructed the jury that it was not to be
governed by bias, prejudice, sympathy, or public opinion." Id. at 254 n.12.
However, presenting highly prejudicial material to the jury while instructing it not to be
prejudiced is like going into a crowded theater and shouting, "There's a fire. but don't panic."
1986]
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context of the entire issue.5°
A subsequent district court decision indicates that the Braun court
may have gone too far. In Faloona v. Hustler Magazine,5" a Texas federal
district court attempted to rescue Braun from its overextension of the
law by stating that even though the Braun court admitted the entire mag-
azine into evidence, the Braun court did not hold that the contents of
Chic magazine placed Mrs. Braun in a false light.52 However, if the en-
tire contents of Chic magazine did not place Mrs. Braun in a false light,
either the entire issue of the magazine (except for the "Chic Thrills" sec-
tion in which Mrs. Braun's picture appeared) was irrelevant or its preju-
dicial impact substantially outweighed its probative value, and it should
not have been admitted.
Apparently, the Faloona decision was a district court's attempt to
bring Braun in line with decisions by other courts in defamation and
invasion of privacy cases. In time, perhaps courts will continue to nar-
row the Braun court's overextension of the law by misstating the Braun
holding, with the result that Braun will in effect be overruled.
Thomas L. Halliwell
50. For instance, if a magazine which caters to a homosexual readership published a pho-
tograph of a non-homosexual, along with an innocuous caption, under Braun the magazine
could be held liable for defamation or invasion of privacy, even if the context in which the
photograph was published did not suggest or create the impression that the non-homosexual
was gay.
51. 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
52. The Faloona court stated:
Braun, of course, states that the entire Chic magazine should be introduced into
evidence "so that the jury could, in effect, be placed in the position of the ordinary
reader." (726 F.2d at 253-54) ....
However, the Fifth Circuit did not hold that Mrs. Braun was placed in a false
light merely because she objected to the contents of Chic . . . . Instead, the court
took pains to describe the actual context in which Mrs. Braun's picture appeared in
the "Chic Thrills" section at the beginning of the issue in question ... [This is the
context in which Mrs. Braun's picture was published. (726 F.2d at 247).
Faloona, 607 F. Supp. at 1356-57 (original emphasis).
According to the Faloona court, the Braun court held:
[T]he "complained-of" publication was capable of conveying "derogatory or false
meaning" because: (i) the ordinary reader could form an unfavorable opinion about
the character of Mrs. Braun (i.e., that she was unchaste or promiscuous); or (ii) the
ordinary reader could assume that Mrs. Braun approved the opinions expressed in
Chic or that she had consented to the publication of her picture in Chic.
Faloona, 607 F. Supp. at 1357-58.
The Faloona court's misstatement of the Braun court's holding is based on footnote 11 of
the Braun opinion, 726 F.2d at 254. There, the Braun court discussed an "implicit" jury
finding that the ordinary reader of Chic would form an unfavorable opinion about a woman
whose picture appeared in Chic.
[Vol. 6
